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Patent Investment Trusts:
Let's Build a PIT to Catch the Patent Trolls
Elizabeth D. Ferrill'
troll (tr6l) n. In Norse Mythology, repulsive dwarfs
who lived in caves or other hidden places. They
would2 steal children and property but hated
noise.
Introduction

I.

Peter Detkin, the assistant general counsel for Intel, coined
the term "patent trolls" in the late 1990s, to describe his own
impression of this new legal dwarf.3 According to Detkin, a patent
troll is "somebody who tries to make a lot of money off a patent
that they are not practicing and have no intention of practicing and
in most cases never practiced." 4 In a business that collects more
5
than $100 billion annually in licensing fees, these patent trolls are 6
for themselves,
taking an ever increasing piece of the licensing pie
much to the chagrin of their prey.

1J.D. Candidate,

University of North Carolina School of Law, 2006. Special

thanks to Frank DeCosta, of Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner,
L.L.P. for his assistance.
2E.D.HIRSCH, JR. ET AL., THE NEW DICTIONARY OF CULTURAL LITERACY 45

(2002). "The troll in the children's story 'The Three Billy Goats Gruff,' for
example, lives under a bridge and is enraged when he hears the goats crossing
the bridge." Id.
3Brenda Sandburg, Inventor's Lawyer Makes a Pilefrom Patents, THE
July 30, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, RECRDR File.
RECORDER,
4

id.

5 Andrew Carter & Fayth A. Bloomer, Generating Cashfrom a PatentPortfolio:
An Overview, PAT. STRATEGY & MGMT., Aug. 6, 2004 at 5.
6 Alexandra Dell, lust Can't Get Enough, INTELL. PROP. L. & Bus., July 2004,
4
availableat http://www.ipww.com/texts/0704/acadiz070 .html (citing that
Acacia Research Corporation's 2004 earnings are projected to be $2.5 million,
up from $599,000 in 2003).
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In the past fifty years, the range of patentable subject
matter has expanded exponentially. 7 Today, patents are issued for
software, genetic information, and even business methods. 8 The
number of patents issued annually has more than tripled in the past
two decades 9 to 169,296 in 2004.10 Additionally, intellectual
property portfolios (of which patents are a major part) have
become valuable assets for businesses and important tools in
attracting investment and venture capital." Modem patents have
an intrinsic value beyond merely the right to exclude
competitors-they serve as powerful marketing tools' 2 and can
have the same influence on a corporation's bottom line as tangible
property assets. 13 In fact, today's intellectual property is a key
corporate asset precisely because it may be the primary driver of
revenue. 14
7 Ben

Depoorter, The SeveralLives of Mickey Mouse: The Expanding
Boundariesof IntellectualProperty Law, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, 11 (2004).
8
Id. at 11-12.
9 Timothy Aeppel, PatentDispute Embroils Host of Industries, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 21, 2004, at B 1.
10Press Release, United States Patent and Trademark Office, USPTO Releases
FY 2004 Performance and Accountability Report (Jan. 25, 2005), availableat
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/O5-O6.htm (citing the number
of utility patents issued in fiscal year 2004). In total, the USPTO issued 187,170
patents, including 169,296 utility patents, 16,533 design patents, and 998 plant
patents. Id. It is interesting to note that current patenting "stampede" is actually
quite unremarkablewhen measured against previous patent cycles in U.S.
history. KEVIN RIVETTE & DAVID KLINE, REMBRANDTS IN THE ATTIC:
UNLOCKING THE HIDDEN VALUE OF PATENTS 14 (2000). There have been
previous upsurges in patenting during the time of Alexander Graham Bell and
Thomas Edison in the 1880s, when there were rapid advances in steam, railroad,
telegraph, and electrical power; between 1902 and 1916, when automobile and
aircraft industries were in rapid early-stage growth; and finally in the 1960s,
when there was a boom in aerospace and plastics. Id.
1 Depoorter, supra note 7, at 28-29.
Id. at 29.
13 Daniel R. Cahoy, Changing the Rules in the Middle of the Game: How the
ProspectiveApplication ofJudicialDecisions Related to IntellectualProperty
Can Promote Economic Efficiency, 41 AM. Bus. L.J. 1, 22 (2003). In fact, some
industry experts argue that the best assets, such as Microsoft's know-how and
Dell's exclusive marketing set-up, are in fact intangible. Bernard Condon,
Management, Strategies, Trends: Numbers Games, FORBES (January 25, 1999).
14 See Cahoy, supra note 13, at 22 n.78.
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The rising speculation in intangible assets by patent trolls
may indicate that patents are ready to evolve to the next level. Just
as air space rights and carbon emissions before them, patents could
be traded on stock exchanges. This evolution could take the form
of a Patent Investment Trust, modeled on the popular Real Estate
Investment Trust ("REIT"). By authorizing a Patent Investment
Trust ("PIT"), the United States Congress could help create a
public market based on patents and patent licensing, harnessing
market power to provide capital for inventors and stabilizing
speculation through more accurate patent prices and licensing fees.
II.

Background
A. Patent Law

The Constitution of the United States authorizes the federal
government to issue patents.1 5 According to Article I, Congress
may "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries."' 6 To that end,
Congress passed a series of Patent Acts, beginning with the Patent
Act of 1790 and most recently with the Patent Act of 1952.17 For
an invention to be patentable, the Patent Act states that the
invention must "(1) constitute 'patentable subject matter,' (2) meet
the technical requirements for patentability, which require that the
invention be 'new,' 'useful,' and 'non-obvious,' and (3) disclose a
written description18 of an invention including the best mode of
carrying it forth.",
In exchange for disclosing such an invention, the United
States government grants the inventor the right to exclusive use of
the invention for a period of twenty years from the patent
15See

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

161d.

Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146, 150
(1989).
17 See

18 Cynthia M. Ho, Who Deserves the Patent Pot of Gold?: An Inquiry intro the
ProperInventorship of Patient-BasedDiscoveries, 7 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE

L. 185, 189 (2004) (citations omitted).
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application filing date.' 9 Thus, the United States Supreme Court
stated that the patent system "embodies a carefully crafted
bargain" between the inventor and society by encouraging the
disclosure of patentable inventions in return for the "exclusive
right to practice" for a period of years. 20 Further, the Court has
stated that Congress intended patentable subject matter to "include
anything under the sun that is made by man., 21 However, the
Court has limited patentability by excluding laws of nature, natural
phenomena, abstract ideas, and mathematical formulas from
patentable subject matter.22
The explicit goal for patents in the Constitution is to
promote the arts and sciences. 2 3 However, legal theorists argue
that in reality the goal of the patent is three-fold: (1) an incentive
for inventors to invent; (2) an incentive for inventors to disclose
their inventions; and (3 to induce firms to invest in innovation of
patentable inventions. While the first two goals reasonably
follow from the constitutional language and the statutory
requirements for patenting an invention, the third goal recognizes
that even after an invention has been patented, "further investment
is often necessary before [the invention] is ready for commercial
exploitation., 25 For example, many inventions will require the
building of new plants or equipment before the commercial
potential of the invention can be realized.26 Therefore in addition
" 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).

Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 150-5 1; see also Ho, supra note 18,
at 189
(describing a patent as a social contract between the inventor and society, where
the public benefits from knowledge in the patent since it is immediately
available and may be instructional for other innovations even though the public
is barred from practicing the patent until the patent term has expired).
21 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,
309 (1980) (quoting a Committee
Report accompanying the 1952 Patent Act).
22 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175, 185-86 (1981).
23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
24 See Rebecca Eisenberg, Patents and the Progressof Science: Exclusive
Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHi. L. REv. 1017, 1024, 1028, 1036
(1989).
25
1Id. at 1037.
26 Id. (noting that in many cases the additional investments required for
successful commercialization may "dwarf the initial research expenditures in
making the invention").
20
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to the incentive to invent and disclose, the initial protection of a
patent may enhance 27 the likelihood that a patented invention can
be successfully commercialized.2 8
B. Modern Patent Enforcement
The increasing importance of patents has resulted in more
vigorous enforcement. 29 In fact, enforcement has become a multibillion dollar industry. 30 Licensing agreements and settlements or
remedies related to infringement litigation are crucial tools of
modem patent enforcement.
While there are multiple types of patent licensing, 3 1 a
licensing agreement is essentially a contract between the patent
owner and another party that wishes to have permission to practice
Some commentators have argued that in a world without a patent protection,
society would actually get the benefit of more new inventions "because
successive innovators will freely be able to build upon earlier advances." Saul
Levmore, Centennial Tribute Essay: Property's Uneasy Path andExpanding
Future,70 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 185 (2003). However, it is also possible that
open access environments could cause stagnation as "innovators try to maintain
their secrets in the absence of a system with registration and protection." Id.
Under our current system the theory seems to be that those who do not own the
patent will still be able to learn from the patent even though they can not
practice it. See Ho, supra note 18.
28 Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 1037.
29 Sandburg, supra note 3.
30 Brenda Sandburg, Pioneers Change Their Business as CorporationsFight
27

Back, THE RECORDER, July 30, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, RECRDR File.
31See RICHARD RAZGAITIS, VALUATION AND PRICING OF TECHNOLOGY-BASED
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 7-8 (2003). In his book, Razgaitis describes six
major types of technology licensing including: enforcement licensing (usually
in the pre-litigation or settlement context, as a patent owner is trying to enforce
his patent rights on an infringer); opportunity licensing (when the seller has
technology that will be of value to a buyer who is seeking to expand into a
market); opportunistic licensing (buyer seeks out a seller to ask to license
previously unavailable or under-valued technology patents); divesture licensing
(a seller who is exiting a business market and seeks to license the technology it
owns that is part of the exited market); partner licensing (usually part ofjoint
venture and may be part of a cross-license); and start-up licensing (buyers
maybe traditional venture capitalists who are looking to fund a new business
based on the technology patents). Id.
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the patent. 32 In addition to actually practicing the patent, licensing
allows patent owners to "extract hidden, additional value" 33 from
their intellectual property, much as a land owner may gain
additional revenue by separately selling surface, mineral, and
royalty rights all from a single plot of land.34
Patent licensing has evolved in the past century.
Historically, the patent owners, corporations such as IBM who
actually manufactured the patented inventions, were the major
licensors of patents rights. For example, in the early 1990s
Microsoft agreed to pay $30 million to license certain Big Blue
patents. As part of the settlement, IBM required Microsoft to turn
over the Windows 3.1 source code to ensure compatibility with
IBM's OS/2 operating system. 36 One can appreciate the economic
importance of licensing by noting that all together, the IBM
Corporation alone takes in about $1 billion a year in licensing
37

revenue.

Eventually, other companies that developed but did not
practice the patented technologies started licensing their patents.38

See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 135 (1969)
("The law also recognizes that [the patentee] may assign to another his patent, in
whole or in part, and may license others to practice his invention.").
33RAZGAITIS, supra note
31, at 6.
34 Susan Warren, As Energy Booms, 'Landmen' of Texas
Enjoy a Gusher, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 7, 2005, at Al.
35 Dell, supra note
6.
36
See RIVETTE & KLINE, supra note 10, at 45-46 (noting that having to
license
its Windows code was especially "onerous" to Microsoft); see also id.at 93-96
(discussing Kodak's infringement of seven patents owned by Polaroid, when it
produced an instant photography camera in the 1970s). Polaroid sued, and
Kodak was deemed an infringer and ordered to pay $925 million in damages,
shut down a $1.5 billion plant, and spend nearly $500 million to buy back 16
million
instant cameras it had sold to customers between 1976 and 1985. Id.
37
Danny Fortson, The Big Squeeze, INTELL. PROP. LAW & Bus., Nov. 29, 2004,
at 19.
38 See Steven M. Cherry, Company Profile:
The PatentProfiteers,IEEE
SPECTRUM, June 2004 at 38, 41. Of course, the patent confers a right to exclude
and the Patent Act does not require the patent owner to actually practice the
patent to get these exclusionary rights. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000).
32
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For example, Qualcomm Inc., founded in 1985, 39 develops
patented cellular technologies and licenses this technology to cell
4°
phone makers, all without actually manufacturing cell phones.
Qualcomm designs and manufactures digital wireless
telecommunications products based on CDMA technology. Sales
of integrated circuits, license fees, and royalties for the use of its
patents provide the company's primary sources of revenue.
With businesses increasingly drawing their revenue from
licensing agreements, patent enforcement companies entered the
market. These enforcement companies do not seek to develop or
outright acquire patents; rather, the companies merely provide the
patent owner with the service of patent enforcement. One
enforcement company, Mahr-Leonard Management, has
represented everyone from National Semiconductor Corp. to
42
Gilbert Hyatt, the inventor of the microprocessor. The average
• • 43 of which it
license fee negotiated by Mahr-Leonard is $10 million,
receives a twenty to twenty-five percent commission. Since

QUALCOMM INC., ABOUT QUALCOMM, at http://www.qualcomm.com/about
history.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina Journal
of Law & Technology).
40 Cherry, supra note 38, at 38, 41. Although the "Qualcomm" name is on many
cell phones, this logo only indicates that the phone contains a Qualcomm
integrated circuit, not that the cell phone was manufactured by Qualcomm. See
QUALCOMM INC., 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 37 (2005), at
http://ww3.ics.adp.com/streetlinkdata/dirQCOMlannual/images/Qualcomm_20
04AR.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); see
also RIVETTE & KLINE, supra note 10, at 119-22 (recounting the story of
Eugene Emmerich whose ultimately unsuccessful research company yielded a
single computer-aided design patent that has since made nearly $50 million in
licensing fees alone). One computer maker, Commodore, even went bankrupt
after it refused to take a license from Emmerich and a court issued a permanent
injunction against Commodore barring sales of their computers in the United
States. Id.
41 See QUALCOMM, INC., supra note 39.
42 Sandburg, supranote 30, at 1. Another successful patent enforcement firm is
General Patent Corp. Founded approximately fifteen years ago, the company is
a "full-service intellectual property management company" which negotiates
licenses and, if necessary, initiate lawsuits on behalf of their patent-owner
clients. See Cherry, supra note 38, at 38, 41.
43 Cherry, supra note 38, at 38, 41.

39
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1988, the company has negotiated more than $700 million worth of
licenses. 44
Recently, a new breed of company has emerged-the
companies that Detkin described as "patent trolls." One of the
leaders in this new breed is Acacia Technologies.45 Acacia
employs more lawyers and accountants than engineers.46
Moreover, the engineers'job is not to create technology, but just to
evaluate patents. In fact, Acacia's sole business is the acquisition
and license ofpatents, followed by aggressive patent
enforcement. Unlike the three previously mentioned types of
companies, "for Acacia Technologies... speculation is the heart
of the game." 49 So far, Acacia has made millions from licenses
and settlements involving streaming media technology, the V-chip,
and video on demand. 50 As of 2005, Acacia has generated $25
51
million from the licensing of the V-chip alone.
III.

The Rise of the Patent Trolls

Unlike copyright owners, 52 patent owners do not have a
robust market in which to license patents, nor do patent owners
44 id
45

Id.at 38, 40.

46Id.at

40.

47 Id.
48 Id.
49

50

1d. at 41.

Id.at 38. Streaming media is "the basic technology by which sound and video
is delivered to personal computers or digital television via the Internet or a cable
box." Id.The "V-chip" is a system designed to let parents block certain types
of televisions programs from their children. Id. In 2001, Congress ordered that
content-filtering technology, like the "V-chip", be installed in all new televisions
sets. Id,
51ACACIA TECHNOLOGIEs GROUP, ACACIA TECHNOLOGIES GROUP FACT SHEET,

at http://www.acaciaresearch.con/pr/AcaciaFactSheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 8,
2005)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
52
See Doug LaLone, What To Do When The Copyright PolicemanKnocks On
Your Door: ASCAP Takes a Stand Against Music Copyright Violators, 83-AUG
MICH. B. J. 28 (2004) (explaining the process that BMI and the American
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers ("ASCAP") use to enforce
performance licenses for music and return the licensing fees to the copyright
holders).
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have a compulsory licensing scheme mandated by law. Although
the value of patents in general is higher than ever,53 often the
individual patents are sold significantly mispriced because
inventors undervalue their patents without objective information
about how much the patent could be worth.54 Further, the pricing
for patents is complicated by the unpredictable nature of
technology and its future financial success. One famous example
of the difficulty of estimating the expected value of present
inventions is IBM's underestimation of the future market for home
computers.55
The lack of a robust patent market combined with other
economic conditions has given rise to patent speculators, the
aforementioned "patent trolls." These patent trolls engage in what
is more accurately termed opportunisticlicensing.56 One nonDepoorter, supra note 7, at 25-26 (stating that "because 'our society is
predominantly and increasingly a service society' and because 'the service
portion is increasingly based on information,' the value of intellectual goods is
now higher than ever") (internal citations omitted).
54 ACACIA TECHNOLOGIES GROUP, Acacia Technologies Slide Presentation, at
http://www.acaciatechnologies.con/presentationmain.htm (last visited Mar. 8,
2005) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology) (showing
that the search for significantly "mispriced" patents is stated business objectives
for the company).
55 Depoorter, supra note 7, at 47; see also Senator Joseph Lieberman, Statement
of SenatorJoe Lieberman on Developing a NationalBroadbandStrategy,
Address at Wind River System, Alameda, California (May 28, 2002), at
http://lieberman.senate.gov/press/02/05/2002528828.html (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology) (recounting a 1943 comment by the
chairman of IBM, Thomas Watson, Sr. who said "I think there is a world market
maybe five computers.").
for
56
Andrea Lynn Evensen, "Don'tLet the Sun Go Down on Me": An In-depth
Look at OpportunisticBusiness Method PatentLicensing and a Proposed
Solution to Allow Small-Defendant Business Method Users to Sing a Happier
Tune, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1359, 1361 (2004). Some commentators
(including the author of this reference) limit the term opportunistic licensing to
"the use of invalidpatents to secure licensing fees." Id. (emphasis added). The
reference points out that the actual validity of the patents will likely never be
decided due to the high cost of litigating. Rather many small defendants are
forced to settle by paying a licensing fee. This Comment will use a slightly
broader definition of opportunistic licensing. By definition, a patent issued by
the Patent & Trademark Office is deemed to be prima facie valid. See 35
53
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technical example of opportunistic licensing is speculators who
buy drilling rights for oil. 57 Opportunistic licensors of patents are
normally defined by two main characteristics. First, patent trolls
tend to buy older patents, which may have been forgotten or
overlooked (and thus cost less to acquire) but still play a roll in
modem technology. 5 Then they aggressively enforce these older
patents against makers of relatively new technologies. 59 Second,
most patent trolls have no plans to practice the patent-they make
all their money from licensing, often under threat of litigation. 60
Patent trolling can be very lucrative for both patent owners
and their lawyers. Suits can settle for as much as $50 million and
most lawyers routinely charge a forty-five percent contingency
fee. 6 1 One of the best-known attorneys in the patent trolling
business had earned at least $400 million in contingency fees
62
through 2001 alone.
A. Criticism of Speculators
The actions of the patent trolls have not gone without
substantial criticism. Some argue that patent trolls, much like their
mythical fabled counterparts, "want glittering pots of gold in
exchange for doing absolutely nothing.' 63 Others argue that the
patent trolls clog up the legal system with baseless litigation and
bankrupt the manufacturers of technology by demanding unfairly
high licensing fees. 64 One attorney, at a major intellectual property
U.S.C. § 282 (2000). Therefore, in this Comment, opportunistic licensing will
mean the use of patents of questionable validity to secure licensing fees.
57 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in PatentLaw,
89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1600 (2003).
58 Sandburg, supranote 3.
59

id.

id.
id.
62 Id. "By the most conservative estimates, the best-known lawyer in the patentenforcement industry, Gerald Hosier, has pulled in a least $400 million in fees
....Lawyers in the field routinely charge contingency fees as high as 45
percent, and suits can settle for as much as $50 million." Id.
60
61

63

id.

64 Aeppel,

supra note 9, at B1. One could argue that a licensing fee should not
be "unfair" if it was the result of an arms-length negotiation between the parties.
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law firm, termed this "the personal injury game comes to patents,"
noting that, as in personal injury cases,65companies often settle
rather than fight out a costly litigation.
A few critics even predict that inappropriate use of patent
laws could ruin the patent system for everyone else by providing
incentives for "pinstriped lawyers instead of white-smocked
inventors"66 as the Constitution had intended.67 Thomas Woolston,
a Virginia business owner, recently claimed that the online
auctioneer, eBay, was infringing his business method patent for
selling auctioned items at a fixed price. 68 He sued eBay and
eventually won a jury verdict of $35 million in May 2003, but the
case is awaiting a decision on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit. 69 For eBay, dealing with the patent troll
incidents like this is "an unfortunate cost of doing business" and
has driven up its costs, 70while diverting time and resources from
business development.
One expert concluded that the patent troll problem
amounted to a hidden tax on technology products, hampering
innovation and preventing a large number of products from
entering the market because the manufacturer could not afford the
risk of patent litigation. 71 One chief executive of an investment
bank worries that there may be "an IP Armageddon coming" as

But it is important to remember that many of the "patent trolls" only approach
established businesses for license fees. The only choice these businesses have is
to settle and pay the licensing fee or fight a costly legal battle. Id.
65 Id.
66 Brad Stone, PatentProblems, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 13, 2004, at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/ 6241971/site/newsweek/ (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
67 See supra text accompanying note 20.
68 Maggie Shiels, Technology Industry Hits Out at 'PatentTrolls,' BBC News,
June 2, 2004, at
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/business/
3722509.stm (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
69 Ellen McCarthy, Waiting Out a PatentFightwith eBay, WASH. POST, Jan. 6,
2005, at E01.
70 Shiels, supranote 68.
71 Stone, supra note 66, at 3.
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more and more firms indiscriminately accumulate patents for the
sole purpose of asserting their rights against others. 72
B. Benefits of Speculators
Given all this criticism of patent trolls, it may seem hard to
find any benefit to their activities. Nevertheless, there are at least
three significant benefits from the patent speculators: They
provide capital to inventors, level the licensing playing field for
small inventors, and redefine the nature of patents as property.
A key point that the critics fail to mention is that the patent
trolls, like Acacia Technologies, buy many of these underutilized
patents directly from the inventors.73 This sale of patents
presumably gives the inventors additional capital with which they
may chose to create new inventions. Once it has acquired the
patent, the patent troll simply uses its much larger resources to
enforce the patent as a property right, thereby recovering its initial
investment along with a substantial profit.
Many of the companies complaining about being
"extorted" by patent trolls 74 are in fact quite aggressive in
enforcing their own patent rights. Perhaps the patent speculators
are merely giving the big guys a little taste of their own
medicine.75 For example, Pitney Bowes, best known for making
postage meters, owns a variety of patents ranging from enhanced

72

Fortson, supra note 37, at 19.

See, e.g., Cherry, supra note 38, at 38 (discussing how Acacia Technologies
bought the V-chip patent, which allows parents to control what children can
watch on the home TV, from two U.S. Air Force officers who invented the
device).
74 Sandburg, supra note 3 (discussing Intel's decision to use the
term "patent
trolls" instead of "patent extortionists" after being sued for libel).
75 This issue of big companies fighting over patent rights is not
a new one. In
fact, even nineteenth-century businesses used the power of patents to help them
dominate markets and competitors, including the "Great Telegraph Wars" of the
1870s between Cornelius Vanderbilt and Jay Gould who hurled legal, financial,
and competitive assaults at each other to control Thomas Edison's telegraph
patents. RIVETTE & KLINE, supra note 10, at 37.
73
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379

network connections for cellular phones 76 to improvements in print
resolution for inkjet printers.77 Although the company does not
make printers, it sued Hewlett-Packard ("HP") for infringement,
leading HP to agree to pay $400 million to settle the suit in mid2001. Perhaps patent speculators signal the end of the "free
ride" 79 that the large companies were taking on the backs of less
affluent patent owners.
Patent speculators are emblematic of the trend in the
intellectual property world to recast patents as a form of
investment property. One company, Forgent Networks, claims it
only turned to enforcing its patents when it became clear that the
company could not survive in the video hardware business.8 °
Forgent has since enforced its patents for a digital video
compression system 8 1 (purportedly used to make JPEG images),
signing multi-million dollar licensing deals with Sony and recently
filing suit against thirty-one others82 for infringement, including
Adobe Systems, Dell, and Xerox.
See U.S. Patent No. 5,974,307 (issued Oct. 26, 1999) (disclosing a method
and system communicating with a voice response unit over a cellular telephone
network).
77 Sandburg, supra note 3; see, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,827,769 (issued
Dec. 7,
2004) (disclosing photosensitive optically variable ink heterogeneous
compositions for ink jet printing).
78 Sandburg, supra note 3.
79
76

id.

80 Mark Hachman, Update: ForgentClaims Rights to JPEG Patent,

EXTREMETECH, July 18, 2002, at
http://www.extremetech.com/article2/0,3973,389261,00.asp (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); see also RIVETTE & KLINE,
supranote 10, at 125-26 (stating that both Texas Instruments and National
Semiconductor were also reportedly saved from bankruptcy by "all-out patent
licensing and litigation efforts").
81Hachman, supra note 80, at 3.
82 Kirk Kroeker, ForgentSues 31 Companies, TECHNEWSWORLD, Apr. 23,
2004, at http://www.technewsworld.com/story/33518.html (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). The list of defendants included:
Adobe Systems, Agfa, Apple Computer, Axis Communications, Canon USA,
Concord Camera, Creative Labs, Dell, Eastman Kodak, Fuji Photo Film, Fujitsu
Computer, Gateway, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, JASC Software, JVC, Kyocera,
Macromedia, Matsushita, PalmOne, Panasonic, Ricoh, Broderbund, Savin,
Thomson S.A., Toshiba, and Xerox. Id.
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Proposed Solution

The rise of the patent trolls may signal that it is time for
society to take the next step in the evolution of patents from only
an investment property to a tradable instrument. Just as air space
rights were redefined in the 1970s, 83 the time has come for the
government and investors to reconsider patents. Instead of mere
intellectual property, patents should be viewed as a tradable
commodity that could be bought and sold on a stock exchange just
like other tangible property. Shares of interest in patents could be
traded on an exchange and the share price would be determined by
market forces.
A. The Market Economy
The United States economy is a market economy that
operates, in part, through a market mechanism. 84 That market
mechanism is an informal network of signals that influences
consumer demand for goods and the use of resources to supply
those goods. 85 Adam Smith, the founder of modem economics,
called the market mechanism the "invisible hand., 86 Price is the
most important signal of the market mechanism since prices
coordinate decisions between buyers (seeking lower prices) and
sellers (seeking to earn profits).87
83

Levmore, supra note 27, at 188; see also Gregory M. Parkhurst & Jason F.
Shogren, EvaluatingIncentive Mechanismsfor ConservingHabitat,43 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 1093, 1111 (2003) (discussing the New York City's Landmark
Preservation Law of the 1970s that allowed owners of historic landmarks who
were restricted from developing the air space above their historical buildings to
sell their air space rights to surrounding building owners who in turn could build
above the zoned height limits). For a more recent example, consider the carbonemissions credit market that has rapidly developed in Europe since the Kyoto
Protocol went into effect in January 2005. See Mark Landler, Mixed Feelings as
Kyoto
Pact Takes Effect, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2005, at C1.
84

DAVID O'CONNOR & CHRISTOPHER FAILLE, BASIC ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES: A

GUIDE FOR STUDENTS 26 (2000).
85 Id. at 27.
86

DAVID O'CONNOR, THE BASICS OF ECONOMICS 9,16

87 O'CONNOR & FAILLE, supra note 84, at 27.

(2004).
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Various industries are categorized by their market
structure. 88 One major characteristic of market structure is the
amount of information available to buyers and sellers about the
market and the product. 89 In a perfectly competitive industry all
the buyers have identical information about the product and its 90
availability and price, and as a result, sellers are "price takers."
In contrast, in a monopolistic market, the seller has all the
information about the market, and buyers could be subject to
abusive pricing if not for government regulation. 91 Further, either
finite resources are
type of market is considered "efficient" when
92
effort.
or
cost,
waste,
undue
without
used
A stock market is a mechanism by which stocks are
traded. 93 Stock markets provide a way to link buyers and sellers of
shares and serve as a means to negotiate a price that is agreeable to
both parties.94 They are an integral component of the U.S.
financial market economy for three main reasons. First, stock
markets provide a vehicle for raising investment capital, since the
proceeds from sales of newly issued stock generates the funds
needed for building plants and purchasing real estate. 95 Second,
stock markets allow investors to earn profits, termed capital gains,
from the purchase and sale of previously issued stock. 9 Finally,
97
stock markets send market signals throughout the economy.
These market signals indicate investors' confidence in specific
corporations, different industries, economic sectors, and the overall
direction of the U.S. economy. 98 Buyers and sellers also make
investment decisions based in part on these signals. 99 Marketoriented institutions, like stock markets, are crucial to the economy
at
88 See id.
89

92.

See id.

at 92-93.
90 See id.
at 99-100.
9'See id.
92 See SUSAN LEE, ABZS OF EcoNoMics 70 (1987).
93 O'CONNOR, supra note 86, at 206.
94

id.
id.
96 id.
95

97

Id. at 207.
98 d.at 206.
99 Id.
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as they provide a workable blueprint for sustained economic
growth.
B. A Market for Trading Patents?
Like other assets in our economy, patents would benefit
from a market-oriented valuation rather than being valued as a
threat or spoils of litigation. Today, companies must rely on a10
sometimes inefficient court system to remedy patent disputes.
However, a market for patents would give inventors and licensees
a more rational valuation for their dealings in intellectual property.
Currently, companies, like Acacia, can make individual deals to
acquire patents, which unbeknownst to the patent holder may be10 2
"significantly mispriced" in the absence of a market mechanism.
Under a market-based system, inventors would have the option of
approaching many investors in an open marketplace before selling
their patents. In addition, inventors would have the option of
retaining some equity in their patent, allowing them to share in the
proceeds if the invention proves to be a commercial success.
While some patents would be considered useful and probably fetch
a high price, other patents would be deemed less useful and thus
sell for a much lower price. Nonetheless, this is the nature of a
market-based system, and hopefully those patents with intrinsic
value will be recognized and not "significantly mispriced" or
undervalued.
Certain patents, of course, will lend themselves to trading
better than others since their value may be more readily
identifiable. For example, patents which are central to many
different products-so-called "foundational" patents-have
reliable streams of income and will by their very nature be more
appealing to traders than more obscure product-specific patents.
Foundational patents include gatekeeper patents to the human

100

Id. at 237.
101 Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market FailureandPrisoner'sDilemma in
IntellectualProperty, 17 DAYTON L. REv. 853, 868 (1992).
102See ACACIA TECHNOLOGIES GROUP, supranote 54.
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genome 10 3 and the original patents for the airplane, both of which
are essentially required to practice in those fields.'0 4 For example,
Glenn Curtiss and the Wright Brothers earned more than two
in 1933 by licensing their foundational airplane
million dollars
10 5
patents.
Further, an efficient market that trades patents should result
in lower transaction costs over individual assignment and licensing
deals. ° 6 A market for licenses could allow "persons bargaining
[to] arrive at prices through a less expensive mechanism than do
litigants suing in courts." 1° 7 One consequence of the change may
be that certain middlemen, such as patent trolls, who profit from
the current system will be squeezed out by a market driven system.
Encouraging a publicly traded market for patents and patent
licensing could be accomplished in a number of ways, but the best
model is a tax-advantaged one based on the existing Real Estate
Investment Trust model. A short introduction to the Real Estate
Investment Trust is necessary to understand how the Patent
Investment Trust could be organized.
C. Real Estate Investment Trusts
Real Estate Investment Trusts ("REITs") allow investors to
holdings with beneficial tax consequences. 108
pool real estate
Congress created the beneficial tax status for REITs in 1960 to
See Jonathan C. Lipson, Remote Control: Revised Article 9 and the
Negotiabilityof Information, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1327, 1410-11 (2002).
104See Robert P. Merges, Contractinginto Liability Rules: IntellectualProperty
Rights and Collective Rights Organizations,84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1344 (1996)
(discussing the aircraft patents issued to Glenn Curtiss and the Wright Brothers).
Id.at 1343-44 n.174. In the original pooling agreements, Curtiss and the
'05
Wrights were entitled to one hundred dollars per airplane produced to a
maximum of one million dollars each. Id. Later the agreement was changed to
a maximum of two million dollars each and then only twenty dollars per
airplane manufactured there after. Id.
106 See Depoorter, supra note 7, at 28 (discussing the savings in transaction costs
for online automated patents rights management systems over previous one-onone licensing systems); see also discussion infra notes 125-127.
107 Gordon, supra note 101, at 868.
108 Chadwick M. Cornell, Comment: REITS and UPREITS: Pushing the
103

CorporateLaw Envelope, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1565, 1568 (1997).
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encourage small investors to participate in the type of real estate
investments that were traditionally available only to more wealthy
investors.l°9 Strictly speaking, REITs are organized as
corporations with shareholders and investors. l0 However, from a
tax perspective, a REIT is a unique combination of a corporation
(with limited liability and transferability of shares) and a
partnership (without double taxation on income). 11' Today, there
are 180 REITs with assets exceeding $400 billion that trade on
major stock exchanges, primarily the New York Stock
Exchange.' 12 In addition, there are over 800 REITs that are either
13
not listed on a major exchange or are privately traded."
Ownership in a REIT is divided into two types. The first
type, called sponsors, contribute real estate in exchange for equity
in the REIT, but do not pay for their shares. 1 4 A second group,
called investors, purchases shares of the REIT outright. 1 5 Both
6
types of owners qualify for dividends. 1
To qualify for the special REIT tax status, Congress has
prescribed a four-part test: organizational requirements, income
tests, an asset test, and distribution requirements." 7 Section 856 of
the Internal Revenue Code contains six organizational
requirements that a REIT must satisfy, including transferable
shares, professional management by trustees, and a minimum of
100 different shareholders."1 8 The income tests are three-fold and
complex, but generally are designed to ensure that the REIT's
earnings are limited to transactions closely connected to real
estate. 1 9 The asset test ensures that the REIT's holdings are
'09 Id. at 1569.
0

Id. at 1570 n.13.
...
Id. at 1569.
112 NAT'L ASS'N OF REAL ESTATE INv. TRUSTS, FrequentlyAsked Questions,
Question #4, at http://www.investinreits.com/learn/faq.cfrn (last visited on Mar.
8, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law and Technology).

113 id.
114

Cornell, supranote 108, at 1569.

115 Id.

See id. at 1572 (showing that the distribution requirements do not distinguish
between the types of shareholders).
Id. at 1570-73.
' 8Id. at 1570-71.
Id. at 1571-72.
116
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primarily comprised of real property or assets related to real
120
property ownership (such as cash from rental payments).
Finally, the distribution requirements state that the REIT must
distribute at least ninety-five percent of its annual income to
shareholders as dividends. 12 1 If a REIT meets all the IRS
requirements, then the REIT may deduct the amount of its
income, thereby avoiding the corporate
dividends from its taxable
122
income.
that
on
tax
D. Patent Investment Trusts
Patterned after the existing REIT legislation, a Patent
Investment Trust, ("PIT"), would be a corporation that trades and
licenses patents rather than real estate. As opposed to encouraging
small investors to invest in real estate, the goal of the PIT would be
to encourage an active market in trading shares related to patents.
Therefore, the PIT model would not necessarily follow all of the
constraints of the REIT model. Under the PIT model, inventors
could sell all or some of their interest in their patents to the PIT. In
turn, the inventor could use the money as capital to develop the
patented invention into a commercially viable product or invent
something totally new. In doing so, the PIT model would promote
scientific progress, serving the original intent of the patent clause
in the Constitution.' 23 Shares of a PIT traded on a major stock
exchange would be priced by the market mechanism, encouraging
more accurately priced patents and license fees.
As with the REIT model, inventors who contribute their
patents in exchange for equity would be called sponsors.
Sponsorship would allow inventors to benefit from any future
appreciation in the value of their invention. However, instead of
receiving monetary compensation, the sponsors of the PIT would
receive shares of the PIT. Alternatively, inventors could choose to
assign their patents outright to the PIT and take the proceeds
120 id.
121 Id. at 1572-73.
122Id. at 1573.
123Eisenberg,

supra note 24, at 1037.
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Others who purchase PIT shares would be called

investors.
To benefit from the special tax status, Congress should
require the PITs to meet the same four tests as the REITs, but
modified to meet the particular goals of the PIT. The requirements
to gain the special tax status would include the organizational,
income, asset, and distribution tests.
The PIT's organizational requirements should include a
separation of management and beneficial ownership as well as
professional trustees.125 However, unlike the REIT, the PIT need
not be held by more than 100 persons, since the PIT does not have
the explicit goal of encouraging small investors. 126 The income
tests would also be required, but the calculations should be
designed to ensure that the PIT's earnings are limited to
transactions related to patents and patent licensing. Likewise, the
asset tests should require that the PIT's holdings are limited to
patents or assets related to patent ownership such as cash (from
licensing fees) and government securities (held for future patent
acquisitions). The purpose of both the income and asset tests is to
ensure that the special tax status of the PIT is used to further the
trading and licensing of patents instead of other forms of property.
Finally, the distribution requirements should state that the PITs
must distribute at least ninety-five percent of their annual income
to their shareholders as dividends. The purpose of the distribution
requirement should be to ensure that as much income as possible is
distributed to the shareholders. If a PIT meets all the IRS
requirements, it would be able to deduct the amount of its
dividends from its taxable income, avoiding double taxation, and
27
thereby encouraging investment in patents.
Assignees (patent owners who are not the original inventor) could also serve
as sponsors or assign their patent rights to the PIT outright.
125 Cornell, supra note 108, at 1589.
126 Further, the PIT need not meet the requirement that not more than fifty
percent of the outstanding stock be held by five or fewer persons. Id. These
requirements for the REIT are to ensure that REITs stay accessible to small
investors. Id. Ultimately, however, Congress would make this policy decision
when drafting the PIT legislation. Congress would also need to determine if it
would allow for the possibility of a single-owner PIT.
127 Cornell, supra note 108, at 1573.
124
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In terms of content, PITs could be organized by subject
area, end-user technology, or even cross-technology. PITs that are
organized by subject area could include only electrical or only
mechanical patents. 128 Alternatively, PITs organized by end-user
technology might include many patents needed to manufacture a
particular device, such as a personal digital assistant ("PDA"). The
most popular PIT might be a cross-technology PIT, because
(similar to mutual funds) a cross section of patents from a variety
29
of technologies offers diversification to manage risk.1 A single
cross-technology PIT, for instance, could contain patents for
isolated, purified DNA, Internet business methods, and even
household consumer products such as bottle openers or disposable
razors.
V.

Advantages of the PITs

To effectively build and sustain a market based on the PIT,
the PIT model must be more attractive to investors than investing
with the patent trolls, like Acacia Technologies, or other forms of
investment. The PIT model embodies a number of benefits that
may lure investors away from patent trolls including tax savings,
protection of the corporate structure, and the availability of patents
for sale.
A. Tax Savings
The major advantage of the PIT model is that the tax
savings will allow the PITs to operate more efficiently and with
This would be similar to how REITs are organized.
REITs invest in a variety of property types: shopping centers,
apartments, warehouses, office buildings, hotels, and others.
Most REITs specialize in one property type only, such as
shopping malls, self-storage facilities, or factory outlet stores.
Health care REITs specialize in health care facilities,
including acute care, rehabilitation and psychiatric hospitals,
medical office buildings, nursing homes, and assisted living
centers.
OF REAL ESTATE INV. TRUSTS, supra note 112, at Question #8.
ASS'N
NAT'L
29
1 See O'CONNOR & FAILLE, supra note 84, at 140.
128
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lower costs than other publicly traded corporations. In addition,
the higher rates of return for this type of investment should
encourage investors, 13 and the tax savings should help ameliorate
the significant market barriers' 3 1 to entering the intellectual
property market. Admittedly, valuation of patents is a hard
problem since the patented technology is by definition unique 132
and it is difficult to accurately estimate "the cost of a license on the
value of the right licensed."' 13 The PIT would not solve this
problem completely, but rather would allow the pricing process to
have greater transparency (as the trust managers and investors
perform due diligence).
Since the PIT would be regulated by the Tax Code, this
model should add a degree of uniformity in business practices of
patent licensing. On a market, the "invisible hand" should guide
prices to reflect problems with patents, such as poor prosecution
histories or invalidity. Therefore, the PITs should encourage more
patent investment and help build a public market that embodies
more accurate valuation of patents and license fees.
A further benefit of the PIT's tax savings may be to
encourage intellectual property owners to do business in the United
States. By developing a tax-advantaged method for patent owners
to value and exploit their intellectual property, the U.S. may be
able to retain patent owners who would otherwise go elsewhere.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that such relocation of intellectual
property is indeed a problem. An acquisition specialist with
PriceWaterhouseCoopers pointed out that a prominent
semiconductor manufacturer moved its intellectual property into a
Hong Kong holding company because of a lower effective tax rate
overseas. 134 For a company with $70 million in annual licensing
royalties, the lower tax rate could mean a savings of over $10
Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 1033 (suggesting that studies have tentatively
shown that private rates of return from investments in research and development
of patented technology is significantly higher than returns available on other
investments).
131 Gordon, supra note 101, at 859.
132 See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (reciting the novelty requirement for all patents).
133Depoorter, supra note 7, at 48.
134 RIVETTE & KLINE, supranote 10, at 170-71.
130
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million in taxes.' 35 While this example concerns corporate income
tax rather than proper valuation of patents and licensing fees, it
shows that companies are willing to move their licensing programs
internationally if necessary to save money. By creating a PIT
structure with tax benefits, the government may lose tax revenue
from some of the double taxation, but the alternative risks the loss
of all tax revenue from intellectual property sent overseas.
B. Corporate Structure
The PIT's corporate structure allows both limited liability
and transferability of shares. This will offer an advantage over
ownership of an individual patent since investing in shares of PITs
will allow investors to diversify their intellectual property
investments and trade more easily. Furthermore, PITs possess an
advantage over traditional corporations in patent enforcement.
When a traditional corporation sues for infringement, often the
defendant files a countersuit.136 However, since the PIT is not in
the business of making or selling any products, there is no way that
it could infringe the defendant's patents. Consequently, PITs,
compared to137traditional corporations, have limited exposure to
countersuit.
C. Many Willing Patent Holders
In a landscape ripe with patent holders1 38 who may be
willing to sell their patents, a PIT could be the perfect vehicle.
Patents for the PIT would come primarily from two sources:
135 Id. at 171.

Id at 135 (discussing the advantage of limited exposure for a corporation that
is137merely a holding company for patents).
136

id.

The proportion of patent recipients who are first-time patentees (small startup firms or independent inventors) has been rising dramatically for more than
two decades. Id. at 18. In 1972, barely five percent of patents went to first-time
patentees, but by 1992 the number had jumped to twenty-three percent. Id. In
addition, small firms produce fifteen percent of all patented innovations, even
though they only spend three percent of the amount that large corporations
devote to research and development. Id. at 19.
138
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inventors and current patent owners. The PIT could purchase
patents directly from the inventor or offer the inventor equity in the
PIT for his patent. Alternatively, industry experts suggest that
many companies may be willing to sell patents they do not plan to
use--operating on the principle that one man's junk is another
man's treasure.
Selling such patents allows companies to
"relieve themselves of poorly performing or nonstrategic
140
businesses in the most profitable way possible.,
Additionally, a PIT model would still allow the coexistence of a completely private market for some patent owners.
Larger drug companies are unlikely to be interested in trading
patents, since most of their revenue is derived from the exclusive
sales of brand-name drugs, and thus their patents are valued
differently than in other industries. 141 Nevertheless, smaller
pharmaceutical research companies may be interested in selling
their patents due to the high costs of innovation and testing for
FDA approval. The PIT model could serve both types of industries
by allowing privately-held trusts to receive the tax benefit, even
without being publicly traded.
VI.

Potential Pitfalls of PITs

The PIT model is not perfect, as many issues arise due to
patent expiration, difficulty of valuing patents, and concerns
common to any corporation, such as the need for good trust
managers.
First, the property owned by the PIT will eventually expire,
in most cases 20 years from the date of the patent application.142
As patent owners are not allowed to collect license fees from
expired patents, 143 expiration of the patent means that the value of
PIT's principle asset (the patent) and the income (patent license
fees) would end at the same time. The PIT should be able to
139

d.at

140Id.at

81.

133. For example, Kodak received $100 million in cash when it
decided to sell its copier business and the associated intellectual property. Id.
141 Burk & Lemley, supra note 57, at 1589.
142 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
143 See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964).
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account for this expiration when determining the price it will pay
for a patent. For instance, the PIT could chose to pay less for a
patent with less income-generating time left before expiration.
Second, patents have traditionally been difficult to value.
To stay in business, a PIT should not pay more for a patent than it
can recover through license fees over the patent's remaining
lifetime. Consequently, the PIT managers will need to make a
careful analysis of many market factors before deciding on the
price they will offer the patent holder. 144 For example, some
business sectors have been actively valuing their patents for the
last decade-so those sectors will have more realistic historical
data about pricing. 145
In addition, when the PIT is considering buying a patent,
the sale price should reflect the uncertainty of claim language1 46 as
well as possibility that thepatent could be invalidated or deemed
unenforceable by a court. 147 This determination would require that
someone knowledgeable in the patent's field, such as an engineer
or a scientist, examine the patent's claims and the patent's
prosecution history. 48 Also, a patent lawyer should review recent
judicial decisions that may affect the patent's value. 14 9 This
examination process is somewhat analogous to the appraisal and
title search process that real estate agents perform in determining
the value of real property.150 In the "ideal" PIT world, those
patents with doubtful enforceability would trade at a lower price
144 RjVETTE & KLINE,

supra note 10, at 169. Some of these factors in a

"rigorous and informed" due diligence process include: expirations, claims and
prior art errors, payment of patent maintenance fees, international validity,
pending infringement actions, other surrounding patents (like blocking patents),
encumbering licenses, and innovation speed and strength. Id. at 169-70.
145 Cahoy, supra note 13, at 22-23.
146

RAZGAITIS, supra note 3 1, at 3.

Cahoy, supra note 13, at 27.
Id. ("[A] patent with a proverbial skeleton in its prosecution history closet
has much less value than one which is relatively solid and not open to attack on
any reasonably foreseeable grounds.").
149 See id. at 25-27.
150 Id. at 23 (pointing out that "although cases that redraw or clarify the lines of
147
48

1

enforceability of real property rights of exclusion do occur, they are quite rare in
comparison to the number of cases concerning validity and enforceability of
intellectual property rights").
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since they are less likely to produce a predictable return on the
investment. 51 In addition, the model investor would scrutinize the
PIT manager's patent valuation process before she bought shares
of the PIT.
Finally, in addition to these PIT model-specific problems,
the PIT will engender all the risks of a more traditional corporation
or trust. To be successful, PITs will require professional trust
managers 52 who are not only adept at managing multiple assets
and collecting income, but also appreciate the intricacies of
structuring and pricing of specialized technology licensing
agreements.1 53 The PIT, as a corporation, will also need to concern
itself with common corporate problems including takeovers and
Security and Exchange Commission disclosure and stock exchange
154
requirements.
VII.

PIT Advantages Over the Other Solutions

Other possible vehicles could solve the problems presented
by patent speculation, but not as well as the PIT model. Some of
these solutions have been implemented to a greater or lesser degree
already. For example, Acacia Technology is organized as a
corporation, whose two classes of stock are traded on the
NASDAQ stock exchange. 55 The first disadvantage of the
corporate model is that Acacia's dividends are subject to double
taxation like all corporations. 156 In addition, Acacia's business
model is to acquire patents (usually "undervalued" ones) and then
. 51 1d. at 23-24.
152 Jack

McCall, A Primeron Real Estate Trusts: The Legal Basics of Reits,

2 TRANSACTIONS 1, 3 (2001) (stating that publicly traded REITs are
"professionally managed by officers generally skilled in real estate acquisition").
153 RAZGAITIS, supra note 31, at
26, 28.
154 McCall, supra note 152, at 3 (noting that similar SEC
disclosures and stock
exchange requirements apply for REITs that are publicly traded).
155 ACACIA RESEARCH CORPORATION,

Investors-Financial Information, at

http://www.acaciaresearch.com/investorsmain.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2005)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). The
corporations two classes of stock are traded under the stock symbols ACTG and
CBMX. Id.
156

See supra text accompanying note I 11.
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license them to potential users or those infringing the patents.
While this business model has undoubtedly been successful, 157 an
inventor or potential licensee cannot take advantage of the market
mechanism that may result in more accurate prices of the patents
or licenses. Finally, the PIT model's tax advantages present a
lower barrier to entry for new investors than the corporate model.
Another company, PLX Systems, launched the Patent and
Licensing Exchange in late 2002.158 While the name sounds
deceptively like a PIT, in fact the Patent and Licensing Exchange
was developed as an intellectual property rights management
system for major patent holders. 159 According to the company, its
system allows patent holders to automatically inventory, classify,
and value assets for online licensing or selling and assists patent
owners with royalty collection. 160 While systems like this one are
important for existing owners to collect licensing revenue from
patents, they are little more than an automated method of doing the
same type of licensing which has been done for some time. Like
the corporate model, this system lacks the ability to leverage the
market mechanism to value patents.
VIII. Conclusion
Changing the tax laws to authorize a Patent Investment
Trust could eventually lead to a stable market for patent sales and
licensing. The beauty of a PIT marketplace is that a patent owner
could shop around to various PITs to find the best sale price for his
intellectual property. An efficient market would stabilize prices
eliminating much of the impetus for the opportunistic licensing of
the patent troll. Less patent trolling should reduce the overall
transaction costs of technology licensing.
If PITs are ultimately successful, then the trusts could be
expanded to include other forms of intellectual property including
See supra text accompanying notes 5 and 51.
Press Release, PLX Systems, About PLX Systems (2004), at
http://www.pl-x.com/ AboutPLX.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Journal
of Law & Technology).
159 Id.
157
158

160

id.
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copyrights and trademarks. A bundle of rights related to a specific
technology, such as cell phone patents and trademarks or business
method patents and software copyrights, could be combined to
create a hybrid PIT. 16 Perhaps a patent market would evolve even
further-could a "futures"
market for pending patent applications
162
not be far behind?

See McCall, supra note 152, at 7 (discussing the hybrid REITs, which are a
combination of both equity and mortgage interests in real properties).
162 But this type of licensing would not be easy. See Ana C. Ward, Smart Pills:
EarlyAdopters; Licensing a PatentApplication Can be Tricky, INTELL. PROP. L.
& Bus., Apr. 14, 2004, at 28. While the inventor has some bargaining leverage
before the patent is issued, this is a limited power. See Meehan v. PPG Indus.,
802 F.2d 881, 885 (7th Cir. 1986) (discussing that abuse of this type of leverage
is a concern because the leverage is only afforded by the anticipation of a
patent).
161

